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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000-—

ELNA A. SHUPE, and
•
YAVETTE SIIUPE, by
and through her Guardian
ad Litem, ELNA A. SIIUPE,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Civil No. 14117
- vc WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, :
INC., a Utah corporation,
and ESCO CORPORATION, an
Oregon corporation,
DefOxidants and
Respondents.
,

: .;

:
000O000

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC,

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Respondent agrees with the Statement of the Kind of
Case as set forth in the Appellants1 Brief.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Respondent agrees with the statement of the Appellants
with regard to the disposition in the lower Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to have the Judgment entered by
the lower Court dismissing Appellants' Complaint affirmed in the
entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of the
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-2ARGUMENT
POINT I
:

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANTS1 COMPLAINT AND HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
A.
APPELLANTS1 DECEDENT WAS IN THE SAME
EMPLOYMENT A3 THE RESPONDENT, WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND APPELLANTS' SOLE REMEDY IS
THEREFORE LIMITED TO COMPENSATION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Appellants' decedent was an employee of Christiansen

Brothers, Inc., the general contractor on the Canyon Road Towers
Condominium project, in Salt Lake City, Utah.

At the time of the

accident in question, the Respondent was a subcontractor of
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. pursuant to a "subcontract Agreement"
entered into on April 25, 1974, whereby the Respondent subcontracted
with Christiansen Brothers, Inc. to design, furnish and install all
electrical work on said project.

(R 22-25) . The vital issue with

which the Court is here confronted is whether the general contractor
Christiansen Brothers, Inc., having engaged the Respondent as a
subcontractor, retained sufficient supervision or control over the
subcontractor such that all persons employed by the Respondent
(subcontractor) should be deemed to be employees of such original
employer (Christiansen Brothers, Inc.).
The Appellants herein assert a cause of action under
the provisions of Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which
provides, inter alia, that:
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-3When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, . . ., his
heirs or personal representative may also have
an action for damages against such third person,
(emphasis added)
This statute would, of course, give an additional cause
of acti/^ to such persons over and above their claim for Workmen's
Compensation under the laws of the State of Utah.
In the case of Smith v. Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P. 2d
994 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the principles which
should be considered in applying the Workmen's Compensation Act to an
analogous problem.

These same considerations were again set forth

in the case of Adaiuson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 Utah 2d
286, 508 P. 2d 805 (1973).

The Court reiterated in Adamson that:

The purpose of the Act is to provide speedy and
certain compensation for workmen and their dependents and to avoid the delay, expense and uncertainty which were involved prior to the Act;
and the concomitant purpose of protecting the
employer from the hazards of exorbitant and in
some instances perhaps ruinous liability. Those
principals are applicable here and correlated
to them is the proposition that the act should
be liberally construed and applied to provide
coverage and effectuate those purposes.
Fundamental standards of justice dictate that it
would be inconsistent to apply the act liberally
in favor of the injured workman in order to find
coverage by one employer on a project, and then
to reverse that policy and adopt a restrictive view
to exclude coverage of another employer on the
project so that a suit could be maintained against
him.
The specific provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
governing the situation here are set forth in Section 35-1-42 U.C.A.
(1953, as amended) which provides, inter alia, that:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in
the trade or business of the employer, such
contractor, and all persons employed by him,
and all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors,
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this
Setion, employees of such original employer.
Directing the Court's attention to Section 3 of the
"Subcontract Agreement" in question here (R 23), it is provided,
inter alia, that:
The Subcontractor shall prosecute his work with
due diligence so as> not to delay the work of
the Contractor or other Subcontractors, and in
the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or
fails to supply the necessary labor and/or materials,
tools, implements, equipment, etc., in the opinion
of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall notify
the Subcontractor in writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after
date of such written notice, the Contractor shall
have the right if he so desires to take over the
work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the
Subcontractor from any further participation in the
work covered by this agreement; or, at his option,
the Contractor may take over such portion of the
Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem
to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work.
It should be further noted that Section 13 of the "Subcontract
Agreement" (R 25) allows the general contractor certain discretion
with regard to the scheduling of the work to be performed by the
Respondent and others performing work on the project.
In Adamson, this Court was confronted with a very similar factual situation as that which now confronts the Court.

The

Plaintiff therein sued Oakland Construction for the wrongful death
of Robert L. Adamson, who was electricuted while doing electrical
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5work in the construction of a hospital in Ogden, Utah.

Oakland

Construction Company, the general contractor, had entered into
a subcontract with an electrical subcontractor, said subcontractor
being the employer of the decedent.

In referring to the provis-

ions of Section 35-1-42 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) this Court held
that it did not seem open to any doubt that the work of the electrical installation by the subcontractor was a part or process in
the trade or business of the general contractor, that being the
construction of the hospital.

The vital question with which the

Court waij concerned however, was whether the general contractor,
having engaged a subcontractor, retained sufficient supervision and
control over that subcontractor under the provision of the above
referenced statute.

The Court there held that the test to be

applied is the "right to supervise and control, and not necessarily the degree to which that right is in fact exercised".
The contract with which the Court was concerned in
Adamson provided that if, in the opinion of the general contractor,
the work of the subcontractor did not proceed satisfactorily, then
after appropriate notice, the general contractor has the right if
he so desires to take over the work of the subcontractor in full.
The general contractor in Adamson also had the right to direct
the sequence of work by the subcontractors, to make changes in
the work done by them, and the right to order work stoppages.
These provisions are essentially identical to the powers of the
general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc., in the case now
before the Court.
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-6The Court, in Adamson, held that the lower Court was
correct in rejecting the Plaintiffs' contention that Oakland
was a wrongdoer not in the same employment as the decedent and
in holding that the Workmen's Compensation was therefore Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy as against these employers.

Summary

Judgment of the lower Court was affirmed.
The case which now confronts the Court is virtually
identical to the Adamson case.

i

The Appellants have attempted to

distinguish Adamson on the ground that the Appellants' decedent

I

was an eiaployee of its general contractor rather than an employee

i

of the subcontractor.

However, under the reasoning of the Court

in Adamson, as well as Smith, this distinction is totally unreason- I
able and invalid.

As the Appellants admit in their Brief, it must

be kept in mind that the test to be applied in these situations is

I

the right of the general contractor to supervise and control the

j

subcontractor, and not necessarily the degree to which the right
is in fact exercised.

Thus, if by virtue of the terms of the

I

"Subcontract Agreement", the general contractor had the right to
exercise sufficient supervision and control over the Respondent,

]

then the employees of the Repondent are in the same position as

i

the employees of the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers,
Inc.

Therefore, no distinction can be drawn as between the two

positions.

I

Appellants references to provisions for an indepen-

dant contractor by virtue of Section 31-1-42 U.C.A. C1953, as

I

amended) are irrevelent here.

j
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-7B.
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT RELEVENT TO THE QUESTIONS NOW BEFORE THE COURT.
The Appellants have attempted to raise issues of fact
in the case at Bar which are entirely irrevelent under the law
of this 3cate.

The Appellants clearly admit in Point I of their

argument that, as articulated by this Court in Adamson, it should
be kept in mind that the test to be applied in these cases is the
right +.o supervise and control, and not necessarily the degree to
around avA attempt to argue issues of fact as to whether or not
the decedent was an employee of a given contractor or whether the
contractor was a subcontractor or independant contractor.

It is

clear from the Coirtplaint on file herein, as well as the Brief filed
by the Appellants, that the Appellants' decedent was an employee of
the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc.

It is further

clear from the uncontroverted Affidavit filed by the Respondent
(R 19-25) that the Respondent was a subcontractor to the employer
of the Appellants' decedent.
Given these uncontroverted facts, the remaining determination that the Court must make is whether the Appellants have
a cause of action by virtue of the provisions of Section 35-1-62
U.C.A. (1953, as amended).

As discussed in Point I A above,

Appellants do not have such a cause of action.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO
APPLY SECTION 35-1-63 U.C.A. (1953, AS AMENDED
IN 1975) RETROSPECTIVELY.
The Appellants have correctly pointed out that the
case of Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205 192 P. 2d 589 (1948) held
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8that:
Where a statute remedial in nature is amended
providing a different remedy, all actions pending
will be covered by the new statutory provision.
However, the Appellants1 argument that Senate Bill #26, passed
by the Utah State Legislature in 1975, amending Section 35-1-62
U.C.A., falls within the purview of Petty is totally non sequitur.
Quite clearly, we are here concerned with an amendment by the Utah
Legislature which in fact grants a cause of action which heretofore
did not exist.

Therefore, this is not merely a remedial statute

which grants a different remedy for an existing cause of action.
The Appellants alleged in the Complaint a cause of action
based in tort.

It is clear that the rights of the parties are es-

tablished at the time that the alleged tort, from which the litigation erises, occurs.

If there is no cause of c^ction available at

the time that the accident occurred, one is not created at a later
date by the adoption of a statute allowing a new cause of action.
The general rule of construction, as it has been applied
by the Utah Supreme Court, is that an act effecting substantive
rights will not be given retroactive effect, unless the act
clearly requires it.

In this case, the statute is silent as to

whether or not the statute is to be applied retrospectively.
Representative of the Utah Supreme Court's position, is In Re
Ingrum's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P. 2d 340 (1944), where the
Court held that a 1943 law applying to estates was not retroactive
and stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-9That this Court is committed to the general
rule cannot be questioned, for in the case
of iiereur Gold Mining and Milling v. Spry,
County Collector, 16 Utah 222/52 Pac. 382,
3 84, Judge Miner said: * Constitutions as
well as statutes, should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show
a clear intention that they should have a
retroactive effect. This rule of construction should always be adhered to, unless
there be something on the face of the statute
putting it beyond doubt that the legislature
meant it to operate retrospectively.1 We
are convinced that the general rule must
apply as Section 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943,
is not a procedural enactment, but is substantive in its effect.
*

*

*

*

*

*

Had the Legislature intended Section 80-12. 7, Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive
effect, it is reasonable to suppose that they
would have made such a declaration in the
amendment.
*

*

*

*

*

*

We are forced to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature is doubtful and
that Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law,
above mentioned, is applicable to the situation before us.
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement on substantive
law seems adamantly clear and the new amendments to Section 35-162 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) should not be applied retrospectively.
In determining whether or not this amendment effects substantive
law, we must consider more thoroughly the Court's decision in the
case of Petty v. Clark, supra, where the Court, in defining substantive law, stated:
Substantive law is defined as the positive
law which creates, defines and regulates
the rights and duties of the parties and
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-10which may give rise to a cause of action,
as distincitve from adjective law which
pertains to and prescribed the practice
and procedure or the legal machinery by
which the substantive law is determined or
made effective.
Obviously, this amendment effects dramatically the
substantive law of the rights of injured workmen under the
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Utah.

This amendment

establishes additional rights and causes of action where none existed under the prior law of the State.

Being substantive in nat-

ure , it therefore cannot be applied retrospectively here.
POINT III
^

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE APPELLANTS1 FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.
The Appellants have suggested in their Brief that the

classifications established by Sections 35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953, as
amended), are unconstitutional.

The Appellants argue that there

is no rational basis upon which such distinction or classification
can be made and, secondly, that the fundamental right of access
to the State Court has been denied.
The guiding principle most often cited by the Courts
is that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed.

16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law,

Section 488. The rule is well settled that a State may classify
persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in-

applicable only to persons or objects within a designated class*
A differentiation, however, is not necessarily a discrimination.
The guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not intend to take
from the States the right and power to classify the subjects of
legislation.

It does not prohibit or prevent classification, pro-

vided s UCM c1as si fication of persons and things is reasonable for
the purpose of the legislation, is based on proper and justifiable
distinctons, considering the purpose of the law7, is not clearly
arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or unduly
to burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration.
16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Section 494.
One of the basic principles involved in considering
the validity of legislation assailed under equality provisions of
the Federal and State Constitutions is that, in the exercise of its
power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws
over matters within its jurisdiction, a State is recognized as
enjoying a wide range of discretion.

16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional

Law Section 495. The authorities state with unanimity that the
question of classification is primarily for the legislature and
that it can never become a judicial question except for the purpose of determining, in any given situation, whether the legislative
action is clearly unreasonable.

16 Am Jr. 2d Constitutional Law

Section 496.
The basic constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation
laws of the State of Utah has been upheld on several occasions.
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-12Park Utah Consol. Mines Company v. Industrial Coram. , 84 U. 481,
.36 P. 2d 979 (1934); United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Industrial Cowa., 107 U. 52, 151 P. 2d 591 (1944); Buckingham Transport Company v. Industrial Commission, 93 U. 342, 72 P. 2d 1077
(1937); and Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 U. 1, 156
P. 2d 835 (1945).
One need only to return to the reasoning of this Court
set forth in Adarason v. Oakland Construction Company, supra, to find
the reasonable and rational basis for the classification of which
Appellants complain.

As the Court said in that case, the pur-

pose of the act is to provide speedy and certain compensation
for workmen and their dependants and to avoid the delay, expense
and uncertainty which were involved prior to the act; and the
concomitant purpose of protecting the employer from the hazards
of exorbitant and in some instances perhaps ruinous liabilities.
Correlated with those principles is the proposition that the act
should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage and
effectuate those purposes. Fundamental standards of justice

i

dictate that it would be inconsistant to apply the act liberally
in favor of the injured workmen in order to find coverage by one
employer on a project, and then to reverse that policy and adopt
a restrictive view to exclude coverage of another employer on the

|

same project so that a suit could be maintained against him.

i

Appellants1 contentions are clearly the opposite of this proposition.
The reasoning in Adamson clearly establishes the rational
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-13and reasonable basis upon which the Section in question is based.
Subsequent changes in the Section by the Utah State Legislature
do not in any way reflect a decision that the statute was unconstitutional as it existed prior to the amendment and Appellants
have cited no authority in support of such proposition.
The Appellants in this case certainly have not been
denied the right to access to the State Court.

The argument pre-

sented by the Appellants that they have been denied access to the
State Court when a cause of action was not stated by their Complaint , is obviously unsupportable.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Respondent respectively submits that
the District Court was correct in holding that the Appellants' Complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could
be granted under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation laws
of the State of Utah.

The Appellants' decedent was in the same

employment as the Respondent at the time of the accident and therefore the Appellants' sole remedy is compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation system in this State.

Clearly, there are no disputed

issues of fact relevant to the question presented to the Court in
this case.
The Respondent further submits that the District Court
was correct is refusing to apply Section 35-1-63 U.C.A. (1953, as
amended in 1975) retrospectively in this case.

This amendment by

the 1975 session of the Utah Legislature clearly was substantive
in nature and not merely remedial and the amendment itself does
not provide for retrospective application.
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-14Further the District Court's decision in this case does
not violate the Appellants' Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States of America.

The classifi-

cation of workers and employers under the Workmen's Compensation
laws of tho State of Utah are based upon reasonable and rational
grounds that have consistently withstood constitution attack.
Therefore, the Respondent respectfully submits that the
District Court's decision in dismissing Appellants' Complaint
herein should be affirmed in its entirety.
Respectfully submittefl this

A

day of September, 1975.

l/^Ao^^TTf
Moffat/ Welling, Eaulsen & Burningham
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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John L. Wung
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^Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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